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Abstract: The authors study the hypothesis that misperceptions of trend productivity growth during the onset 
of the productivity slowdown in the United States caused much of the great inflation of the 1970s. They use the 
general equilibrium, sticky price framework of Woodford (2002), augmented with learning using the techniques 
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The authors allow for endogenous investment as well as explicit, exogenous 
growth in productivity and the labor input. They assume the monetary policymaker is committed to using a 
Taylor-type policy rule. The authors study how this economy reacts to an unexpected change in the trend 
productivity growth rate under learning. They find that a substantial portion of the observed increase in 
inflation during the 1970s can be attributed to this source. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The great inﬂation and the productivity slowdown
Broadly speaking, U.S. inﬂation was low in the early 1960s, then high in the
1970s and early 1980s, and then lower again during the last twenty years. Figure
1 shows one measure of the dramatic rise and fall, which is sometimes called the
great inﬂation. We investigate the hypothesis that much of the great inﬂation was
due to a misperception on the part of economic actors–both the private sector and
the Federal Reserve–concerning the pace of productivity growth. This hypothesis
is associated most closely (and most recently) with Orphanides (2000a, 2000b,
2001, 2002). The broad idea is that it was initially very diﬃcult for the economy’s
participants to detect that the productivity slowdown had occurred–that is, agents
had to learn about it. The misperception caused the central bank to overestimate
the size of the output gap, leading through a Taylor-type policy rule to lower-than-
intended interest rates and, subsequently, higher-than-intended inﬂation.
Our vehicle for analysis is a version of the general equilibrium, sticky price
model of Woodford (2002). We allow for endogenous investment along with explicit,
exogenous growth, both of which we view as essential for discussion of this issue.
We include learning to capture the idea that it took some time for the economy’s
participants to evaluate the changing nature of the nation’s balanced growth path
dictated by the productivity slowdown. Our learning methodology is that of Evans
and Honkapohja (2001).
For the purposes of this paper, we use a Perron (1989)-style characterization
of the productivity data, in which trend-stationarity is buﬀeted by rare breaks in
trend, occurring perhaps once or twice in the postwar data.3 This means the process
driving productivity growth is actually nonstationary. The agents in our model–
both the central bank and the private sector–suspect that such shocks change may
occur, and employ learning algorithms to ensure that they will be able to adjust. In
this sense the agents in our model are protecting themselves against the possibility
of structural change–permanent changes in key aspects of the economy, like the
pace of productivity growth–by re-estimating their perceived laws of motion for the
economy each period. When there is no structural change for a period of time, our
systems will simply converge to a small neighborhood of the rational expectations
equilibrium, balanced growth path. But when structural change does occur, the
agents will be able to learn the new balanced growth path. Thus, learning will act
as the glue that holds the piecewise balanced growth paths of our model together.
Our paper concerns a quantitative assessment of the reaction of key macroeconomic
variables to permanent productivity growth shocks in this environment.
Of the many recent hypotheses for the 1970s inﬂation experience, the “misper-
ceived change-in-trend” view has some of the more jarring policy implications. It
3For recent empirical papers concerning trend breaks in productivity, see Bae, Lumsdaine, and
Stock (1998) and the survey by Hansen (2001). Our reading of the empirical literature is that it
is diﬃcult to reconcile a completely trend-stationary view with the macroeconomic data.
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Figure 1.  U.S. inflation, 1960-2002
Core PCE inflation from one year earlier.
Personal consumption expenditures inflation rate from the
previous year, less food, energy, and insurance payments.
FIG. 1 The U.S. inﬂation experience includes a sharp increase in observed inﬂation
following the onset of the productivity slowdown in the early 1970s. Excluding
volatile components and smoothing the data slightly provides one indication of
what might be called medium-run inﬂation movements. Our analysis is designed
to address movements at this frequency.
suggests the possibility that even a determined and knowledgeable central bank
could end up with a lot of inﬂation. The monetary authorities are determined and
knowledgeable in the sense that they are committed to using a Taylor-type pol-
icy rule that would be optimal or near-optimal in some stationary contexts where
structural change never occurs.4 Since productivity growth is notoriously hard to
track, because of noise and measurement problems in the data, and since, at the
same time, productivity is critically important for economic growth, it seems quite
reasonable that some learning about rare changes in its mean growth rate must
occur. Thus it is not out of the question, under this hypothesis, that the inﬂation
experience of the 1970s could be repeated, given the right type of shock. Under-
standing this shock and what might be done should it occur again would then be a
key concern for policymakers.
A backdrop to this issue is the more recent improvement in U.S. productivity
4The argument that monetary policy during the 1970s was essentially the same as the policy
recommended as optimal or near-optimal in the recent literature has been made by Orphanides;
see for instance Orphanides (2002). See the papers in Taylor (1999) for arguments that Taylor-type
policy rules provide desirable policy outcomes.
2growth during the 1990s, the so-called “new economy.” To the extent that private
sector actors and policymakers had to again learn about the changing nature of the
balanced growth path, this event might have been expected to lead to lower inﬂation
through a Taylor-type policy rule. We provide an assessment of this hypothesis as
well.
1.2. Model summary
We use a version of Woodford’s (2002) general equilibrium, sticky price model
with endogenous investment. We include explicit, exogenous growth in the model,
driven by growth in the labor force as well as productivity. We maintain the as-
sumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor inputs, but we allow for a homogeneous capital
input, traded in a perfectly competitive and economy-wide capital market. The
main reason for the homogeneous capital assumption is to keep the model rela-
tively simple and comparable with models currently used for policy analysis. The
model economy has a well-deﬁned rational expectations equilibrium characterized
as a balanced growth path. We assume the economy begins on such a path. Our
experiment is to unexpectedly alter the rate of growth of productivity along this
path, and allow the economy’s actors to adapt to the new rational expectations
equilibrium. So long as the system is expectationally stable (which we verify), the
disturbance to productivity growth will only temporarily cause the system to de-
part from the rational expectations equilibrium, as the agents will eventually learn
the new equilibrium.
We include learning in the model using the methodology of Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001). Expectations are formed by agents using well-speciﬁed vector autore-
gressions updated each period as new information becomes available. The regres-
sions are well-speciﬁed in the sense that they are consistent with the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium law of motion for the economy.
1.3. Main ﬁndings
We ﬁnd that a one-time, unexpected change in productivity growth of the mag-
nitude observed in the early 1970s generates a lot of inﬂation in our model, arguably
a large portion of the persistent inﬂationary acceleration during this period. Thus
our assessment is that the “misperceived-change-in-trend” view has considerable
merit, even in the context of a completely micro-founded, forward-looking, general
equilibrium model with endogenous investment.
We also ﬁnd, however, that the inﬂation generated by the productivity slowdown
in this model is far too persistent, as it does not fall rapidly enough by the early
1980s to provide a satisfactory account of the data. The onset of the new economy
in the 1990s does lead to disinﬂation, but the model misses the sharp disinﬂation
of the early 1980s. This suggests to us that a change in the policy rule occurred
during the ﬁrst portion of the Volker era. When we add a modest, unexpected
reduction in the target rate of inﬂation in 1980, which might be viewed as a good
3approximation to policy developments at that time,5 then the model can capture
a substantial portion of the medium run movements in inﬂation from 1970 to the
present depicted in Figure 1. We also show that other features of the simulated
economy, including the pattern of inﬂation expectations and the pace of output
growth, are close to observations from the postwar U.S. data.
We ﬁnd that an important component of our quantitative results is that we
allow both the central bank and the private sector to learn about the change in
the balanced growth path. If the private sector has rational expectations while
the central bank does not, then they understand more than the central bank both
about the shock that has hit the economy and about the nature of the central
bank’s reaction to that shock. That is, they understand that the central bank is
setting the nominal interest rate at “too low” of a level and accordingly they take
actions that mitigate the inﬂation that would otherwise occur. We discuss this and
other variations of the model in the results section of the paper.
1.4. Recent related literature
A number of authors have recently put forward formal models oﬀering an expla-
nation for the postwar U.S. inﬂation experience. Examples include Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999), Christiano and Gust (1999), and Albanesi, Chari, and Chris-
tiano (2002). The studies of Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002),
and Williams (2003) emphasize possession of a misspeciﬁed model on the part of
policymakers. Our learning methodology is similar to theirs, but in our systems the
learning dynamics simply converge to the economy’s unique balanced growth path
following a disturbance (that is, we have the mean dynamics of Sargent (1999) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001)).
Orphanides (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002) has written extensively on the 1970s
U.S. inﬂation experience from the perspective of policymakers at the time. His
work suggests that the perceived output gap was quite large during this period,
and that this inﬂuenced policy appreciably. Lansing (2002) studies the interaction
of monetary policy and trend growth changes in a simpliﬁed version of Fuhrer and
Moore (1995), and ﬁnds a modest increase in inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et oap e r m a n e n t
technology shock. For research concerning optimal monetary policy, see Tambalotti
(2002), who studies policymaker reactions to persistent, but not permanent, shocks
to technology, in a model without capital. Tambalotti (2002) does not consider the
policy ‘mistake’ discussed in Orphanides’ papers. Nelson and Nikolov (2002) study
the productivity slowdown-inﬂation nexus in the U.K.
5In all other respects the policy rule remains unchanged.
42. THE ENVIRONMENT
2.1. Exogenous growth
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by h.T h e
size of the aggregate labor force is described by Nt which grows according to
Nt = ηNt−1, (1)
with η ≥ 1, and the normalization N0 =1 , so that η is the gross rate of growth
i nt h el a b o rf o r c ef o rt h ee c o n o m y . W ea s s u m et h i sg r o w t hi se q u a l l yd i s t r i b u t e d
across households h, so that the size of each household also grows at gross rate η.
Individual households are of size Nh






We also assume explicit technological progress. We take the most standard case
by assuming that this progress, deﬁn e di nt e r m so fe ﬃciency units Xt,a ﬀects only
labor productivity. Productivity is assumed to grow according to
Xt = γXt−1, (2)
with γ ≥ 1 and initial normalization X0 =1 . We assume labor productivity im-
provements apply equally to all households.
2.2. Notation
Given the many changes of variables we use below a few comments about the
notation are needed. Because of the exogenous growth, a given variable Yt may
possibly be non-stationary in our model. Aggregate output and aggregate capital,
for instance, will grow over time. Where necessary, we denote such a variable in
stationary form as ˆ yt = Yt
XtNt. We will take logarithmic deviations from a steady





,w h e r e¯ y is the steady state
value of the stationary variable ˆ y.A n dﬁnally, for our learning model we will want
to refer to the logarithm of the steady state component of this deviation separately,
and so we denote yt =l nˆ yt and y =l n¯ y.
2.3. Household decisions
Each household h makes expected utility-maximizing decisions regarding con-























Here, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and Ch
t+i is an index of household h consump-
tion at date t+i. In the economy a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods are supplied,
indexed by f ∈ (0,1). Each household consumes some units of each good produced.
Each individual good Ct (f) is produced by using capital and a specialized labor
5input–labor of type f is used to produce the diﬀerentiated good indexed by f.W e











Following Woodford (2002), every household h simultaneously supplies all types of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor Lh
t (f),w i t ha>0 and ν ≥ 0. Households are endowed with one
unit of time, and so we require
R
Lh
t (f)df ∈ (0,1).
The function Ψ(·) denotes the utility derived from holding real balances Mh
t /Pt,
where Mh
t is nominal money balances held by household h at time t, and Pt is the
price index associated with Ch









where Pt (f) is the price associated with good Ct (f). We will denote ˜ β ≡ βη, and
call it the ‘eﬀective’ discount factor.












t (f)Wt (f)df , (6)
where Γh
t deﬁnes the nominal proﬁts from holding a share of each ﬁrm in the
economy, and Wt (f) is the nominal wage paid by the ﬁrm that uses labor of type
f.W el e tBh
t denote household holdings of ﬁnancial assets other than money.6 The
short-term nominal interest rate, it, is assumed to be controlled directly by the
central bank.
We emphasize that under our assumptions the consumption decision of every
household h is identical because each household receives the same ﬂow of income
and shares the same initial money and other asset holdings. From the asset accu-
mulation decision, we obtain the Euler equation








is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the optimization problem and Ct = R
Ch
t dh = Ch
t .

















6Here we assume complete markets; for details, see Woodford (2002), Ch. 2.
6where
Wt(f)
Pt is the real wage. We assume that the labor market is competitive, so
that the households take the wage as given. Equation (10) can also be expressed




= ˆ λt. (11)
where ˆ wt (f) represents the real wage per eﬃciency unit Wt (f)/(PtXt).W eh a v e
dropped the subscript h because the labor supply decision is identical across house-
holds, given that they have identical preferences and make identical consumption
decisions (in particular, Lt(f)=
R
Lh
t (f)dh = Lh
t (f)). Moreover, bond and money
holdings will be the same for every agent.
2.4. Firm behavior
Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated good and has some market power. As men-
tioned above, we assume that each good is produced using capital and labor. We
assume that capital is homogenous in the economy, while labor is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. For
capital, we assume the existence of a perfectly competitive, economy-wide market.
Each ﬁrm, in order to produce its diﬀerentiated good, uses a diﬀerent type of labor.
The households supply labor hours Lt (f)=
R
Lh
t (f)dh to the ﬁrm producing good
f, given the wage oﬀered by the ﬁrm. Again, we assume that labor markets are
competitive.7




where Kt (f) is the portion of the capital stock used for production at time t by
ﬁrm f and Lt (f) is the amount of hours households supply for production. The
optimal allocation of household spending across diﬀerentiated goods implies the







where (θ − 1)
−1 denotes ﬁrms’ markup and where Yt = Ct + It =
R
Yt (f)df , and
It =
R
It (f)df is aggregate investment. Cost minimization then implies the real







where St (f) is real marginal cost and the marginal product of labor is given by




7See Woodford (2002) for a discussion.
8This is a standard result implied by the consumption aggregator.
9We follow Woodford (2002) and Erceg (1997).












Given the assumption of an economy-wide capital market each ﬁrm faces the same
rental price of capital, and thus it is not indexed by f. A tt h es a m et i m e ,e a c hﬁrm
faces a diﬀerent wage in the labor market for the type of labor needed.
The objective of a ﬁrm is to maximize expected future proﬁts. Assuming convex
adjustment costs as in Casares and McCallum (2000) and Woodford (2002), proﬁt






































is total investment expenditure. In particular, the function I (·) describes the
amount of resources needed in order to obtain Kt+1 units of capital. It has the
properties
I (γη)=γη − 1+δ, (20)




(γη)= ψ > 0, (22)
where  ψ denotes the cost of adjusting the capital stock.10





















where ξ is the probability of not changing the price, which is assumed to be equal
across ﬁrms, and ¯ Π is the gross target inﬂation rate (we use πt =l nΠt, and ¯ π =
10See Woodford (2002) for discussion.
8ln ¯ Π for the net inﬂation rate and the net inﬂation target, respectively). This
price setting equation is consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms not choosing the
optimal price in period t adjust their prices according to the following rule of thumb
Pt (f)=¯ ΠPt−1 (f), (24)
which corresponds to automatic adjustment by the amount of the inﬂation target.
This updating rule is chosen to keep the model simple. It could be objected that in
periods of high inﬂation ﬁrms should change prices every period according to past
inﬂation, as suggested by Christiano, et al., (2001). We choose instead to keep the
inertia in the inﬂation rate generated by the model under rational expectations as
low as possible, in order to be able to better assess the role of learning in generating
persistence.
2.5. The linearized model
We wish to linearize the model about the nonstochastic balanced growth path
in order to be able to apply the learning methodology of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). We begin by considering household behavior. Concerning the labor supply
we obtain
˜ wt (f)=ν˜ Lt (f) − ˜ λt (25)
where we recall that ˜ xt denotes a logarithmic deviation of a stationary variable ˆ xt
from the deterministic balanced growth path value ¯ x. The Euler equation becomes
˜ λt = Et (˜ ıt − ˜ πt+1)+E˜ λt+1. (26)
Linearizing equations (14)-(16) implies that, after some algebra, we can express the
real rental price of capital as
˜ RK
t = ρy˜ yt (f) − ρk˜ kt (f) − ˜ λt. (27)
By inserting (27) in the linearized (17) and averaging across ﬁrms, we ﬁnd the
following approximation for capital dynamics
˜ λt +  ψ
³





















˜ kt+2 − ˜ kt+1
´
. (28)





γη˜ kt+1 (f) − (1 − δ)˜ kt (f)
i
, (29)
where ˜ I denotes deviations of investment per eﬀective worker from its steady state,
as a percentage of output per eﬀective worker. Using (29) in the economy’s resource
9constraint, averaging across ﬁrms, and substituting for consumption in (8) after
linearizing we obtain








γη˜ kt+1 − (1 − δ)˜ kt
´¸
. (30)
In addition, with some algebraic manipulation we can express average real marginal
cost as
˜ St = ω(˜ yt − ˜ kt)+ν˜ kt − ˜ λt, (31)
where ω = ωp + ωw and ωp = α
1−α and ωw = ν











(1 − δ) − (ω − ν)
¸
˜ kt, (32)
where, following Woodford (2002), we deﬁne σ as the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption (which is equal to one here because consumption pref-


















t is the optimal relative price. In Appendix A we show how the real
marginal cost can be expressed just as a function of output and the average marginal
cost only, that is,












Finally, using the demand for output of ﬁrm f and substituting (36) in the price
setting equation we get a Phillips curve, which has the standard form











2.6. The central bank
We assume that monetary policy is conducted according to a time-invariant,
Taylor-type policy rule. The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate
10in response to deviations of inﬂation and output growth from the inﬂation target
and the long-run growth trend, respectively. The rule is given by
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)
£
Eti + φπ (πt − ¯ π)+φy (gyt − Etgy)
¤
(39)
where it is the net nominal interest rate, ¯ π is the central bank’s inﬂation target, ρ,
φπ, and φy are parameters, gyt = yt − yt−1 +l nγη is the observed output growth
rate, Etgy is the central bank’s estimate of the growth trend, and Eti is the central
bank’s estimate of the long-run level of the nominal interest rate. We stress that
to make this rule operational in our framework, the bank needs the estimates Etgy
and Eti. This latter term depends on the long-run real rate of interest, which will
change when the productivity growth rate changes. The hypothesis we wish to
investigate works as follows. As the productivity slowdown hits the economy, the
bank observes a decrease in the current growth rate of output while its current
estimates of the growth trend and the real interest rate remain unchanged. Hence,
the bank perceives a negative “output growth gap” and reduces the nominal interest
rate.
The choice of a rule that responds to the output growth gap instead of to the
output gap is dictated by an important consideration in a model with explicit
exogenous growth: The steady state level of output per eﬃciency unit is negatively
related to the growth rate of productivity (see the calculation in Appendix B).
Hence, if the bank were assumed to respond to deviations of output per eﬃciency
unit from its estimated steady state value, a decrease in the productivity growth rate
would actually lead the central bank to increase the interest rate, not to decrease
it. The eﬀect would go in the wrong direction from the perspective of evaluating
the “misperceived-change-in-trend” hypothesis. The problem is avoided if the bank
is assumed to respond to deviations of the output growth rate from the long-run
trend growth rate.
Orphanides (2001) argues that a Taylor-type rule that reacts to the output
growth gap may be more stabilizing than a rule that responds to the output gap,
in the sense that the implied policy mistake is smaller. This conclusion does not
necessary hold in the present model. In fact, the result of Orphanides (2001) is
b a s e do nt h ef a c tt h a tt h eg r o w t hr u l ei ss t i l lb a s e do ne s t i m a t e so fp o t e n t i a lo u t p u t .
He argues that a rule that responds to output growth would be more stabilizing
because the mistakes from the estimation of potential output would ‘cancel out.’
This does not happen in our case because the central bank is directly estimating
the trend growth rate. Its mistakes will therefore be autocorrelated.
2.7. The complete model
2.7.1. Deviations form versus levels form
We can now express the model in a relatively compact form, and brieﬂyc o m p a r e
it to standard models without investment dynamics. However, the deviations from
steady state form of the model is still not suﬃcient for our purposes, because we
11want to introduce learning in the next section. When agents learn, they do not
know the steady state values of each economic variable. In order to force them
to learn these values when the productivity growth rate changes, we rearrange the
logarithms of steady state values into a constant term in a “log-levels” form for
each equation. In the model with learning, the constant terms will be estimated
recursively by the agents each period.11
2.7.2. IS equation
Putting together the equations (26) and (30) implies











γη˜ kt+1 − (1 − δ)˜ kt
´
, (40)
which can be also written in terms of investment
˜ yt = −σ−1Et (˜ ıt − ˜ πt+1)+Et˜ yt+1 − Et˜ It+1 + ˜ It (41)
as deviations from steady state. This equation can be expressed in log-levels form
as12




[γηkt+2 − (1 − δ)kt+1]+
¯ k
¯ y
[γηkt+1 − (1 − δ)kt]. (42)
This equation diﬀers from the standard version of the forward-looking IS curve in
that investment appears. An expected increase in investment has a negative eﬀect
on consumption and therefore output. We emphasize that, in order to preserve the
symmetry between the central bank and the private sector’s information set, we
assume that the households need an estimate of the long run nominal interest rate
in order to take consumption decisions (that is, Eti in the ﬁrst term on the right
hand side). Writing this equation is in simpler notation we get
yt = a00+a01Eti+a02Et (it − πt+1)+a03Etyt+1−a04Et (kt+2 − kt+1)+a05 (kt+1 − kt),
(43)
where
a00 = −σπ, (44)
a01 = σ, (45)
a02 = σ, (46)





11If we did not do this, we would in eﬀect be telling the agents the value of the new steady state
in the event of a structural change. This does not seem very reasonable, and would in any event
be contrary to the hypothesis we are trying to investigate.





(1 − δ). (49)
2.7.3. Phillips curve
Substituting equation (32) for the average marginal cost in (37) we obtain
˜ πt = ψ
h¡
ω + σ−1¢
˜ yt − σ−1˜ It − (ω − ν)˜ kt
i
+ ˜ βEt˜ πt+1, (50)
where the marginal cost depends also on investment. Expressed in terms of capital
only, this equation becomes
˜ πt = ψ
¡
ω + σ−1¢







(1 − δ) − (ω − ν)
¸
˜ kt + ˜ βEt˜ πt+1. (51)
F o l l o w i n gt h es a m ep r o c e s sa sf o rt h eI Sc u r v ew ec a nd e ﬁne the equation in log-
levels as




1 − ˜ β
´
















a14 = ˜ β. (57)
2.7.4. Capital equation
Substituting (30) in (28) we obtain
 ψ
³







































˜ kt+2 − ˜ kt+1
´
, (58)
13which, in log-levels, can be expressed as
kt = a20 + a21Etyt+1 + a22Etkt+2 + a23yt + a24kt (59)
where
























a23 =¯ a−1σ−1, (63)
a24 =¯ a−1
·



























3.1.1. Learning by the private sector
The model can be re-written to a four dimensional system of equations expressed
as









t−1Vt+1 + B4Vt−1 + B5 t, (66)
where Vt =[ yt,π t,k t+1,i t]0, Ecb
t−1 denotes the expectation operator for the central
bank and E
ps
t−1 is the expectation operator for the private sector,  t is a normally
distributed i.i.d shock, and the matrices Bi,i=1 ,2,3,4,5 are conformable. The
private sector makes forecasts concerning future inﬂation, output and capital (in
eﬃciency units) in order to take consumption and production decisions. The central
bank requires an estimate of the trend growth rate of output to assess the magnitude
of the output growth gap. Both the central bank and the private sector households
require an estimate of the steady state value of the nominal interest rate in order to
m a k ed e c i s i o n s .W ew i l lr e q u i r et h i se s t i m a t et ob et h esame for the central bank
and the private sector.
Let us ﬁrst consider private sector expectations. Following Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001), market participants have a correct (in form) model of the economy,
known as the perceived law of motion, or PLM. They believe the economic vari-
ables in the economy evolve according to
Vt = Ω0 + Ω1Vt−1 + et, (67)
where et is an unobservable i.i.d. shock. The agents must estimate the elements
of the matrices Ω0 and Ω1 recursively. We stress that the presence of the constant
14implies that the agents do not know the steady state value of Vt. Under this PLM
the agents form expectations according to13
Et−1Vt = Ω0,t−1 + Ω1,t−1Vt−1, (68)
and
Et−1Vt+1 = Ω0,t−1 + Ω1,t−1Ω0,t−1 + Ω2
1,t−1Vt−1. (69)
We assume that the agents update the estimates of the VAR parameters using
new observations available each period on Vt. We assume the agents use stochastic
gradient learning, so that the parameters are recursively estimated according to








t =( Ω0,t,Ω1,t.), Zt =[ 1 ,y t,πt,k t+1,i t],a n dζ is the gain.
We chose the stochastic gradient speciﬁcation for two main reasons. First, it
may be viewed as more plausible in a behavioral sense, as it is less complex than
recursive least squares. Second, we found in the simulations that under recursive
least squares, the system quite often leaves the basin of attraction of the rational
expectations equilibrium and diverges, even if it is, technically, locally stable. In
other words, the basin of attraction is quantitatively small. In order to achieve
stability of the learning process under recursive least squares, we needed to use
an extremely small value for the gain parameter, which in turn slowed down the
learning process to an empirically implausible rate.
As we have stressed, the private sector agents in the model also need an estimate
of the long run nominal interest rate. Sincet h e yu s et h es a m ee s t i m a t ea st h ec e n t r a l
bank, we discuss it in the next section.
3.1.2. Learning by the central bank
Simple method Under the simple method, we assume that the central bank es-
timates the trend of output growth by minimizing the squared deviations of output
growth from the constant trend. This leads to the following recursive estimate of
gy,
˘ gy,t = ˘ gy,t−1 + ζ (gy,t − ˘ gy,t−1) (71)
= ˘ gy,t−1 + ζ (yt − yt−1 +l nγη − ˘ gy,t−1)
where ˘ gy,t is the estimate of the growth rate at time t. Under this method the central
bank does not eﬃciently use all the information available to estimate the growth
trend. It might use other relevant variables to improve its estimates, as under the
13When studying the learning process we follow Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and assume that
the economic agents take expectations using t−1 information. This is the “dating of expectations”
issue that often arises in learning environments. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) have viewed (t − 1)-
dating as more realistic in a learning environment. The assumption of t-dating under learning can
be employed at the cost of some complications, but then date t variables are being used to form
expectations and are also being determined by the system at date t. The simultaneity is common
in models solved under rational expectations, but is less satisfactory in a learning environment.
15model consistent method outlined below. But in order to do that the central bank
needs to know more details about the model of the economy. The simple estimation
procedure does not require such precise knowledge about the economy. In this sense,
the simple method keeps the assumption of bounded rationality applicable to the
central bank.
Finally, both the central bank and the private sector need an estimate of the
long run nominal interest rate. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that
the agents use the steady state relation between the growth rate of output and
the nominal interest rate in order to estimate the long run nominal rate. From
Appendix B, we know that in steady state
lnγ − lnβ +¯ π = i. (72)
Adding and subtracting lnη o nt h el e f th a n ds i d ew eg e t
gy − lnηβ +¯ π = i. (73)
Hence, both the central bank and the private sector can use the following estimate
of the long run nominal interest rate14
Et−1i = ˘ gyt−1 − lnηβ +¯ π. (74)
Inserting the expectations of both private sector and the bank in (66) we obtain
the actual law of motion (ALM)
Vt = ˘ B1 + ˘ B2˘ gy,t−1 + B3
£
Ω0,t−1 + Ω1,t−1Ω0,t−1 + Ω2
1,t−1Vt−1
¤
+ B4Vt−1 + B5 t (75)
where ˘ B1 and ˘ B12 are suitable transformations of B1 and B2. The dynamics of the
economy is characterized by (75), (71) and (70).15
Model consistent method The learning algorithm (71) is assumed to approxi-
mate the actual estimation process of the Federal Reserve in the seventies. It is
reasonable to ask what would be the eﬀects on the economy if the bank used more
sources of information to estimate the output growth trend. At the rational expec-
tations equilibrium, it is possible to express the growth rate of output as a function
of past output, capital and the interest rate. We can then assume that to be the
perceived low of motion of the growth rate of output:
gyt = κ0 + κ1yt−1 + κ2kt−1 + κ4it−1. (76)
14We are implicitly assuming that the agents have already learned the value −lnηβ +¯ π.T h i s
is a constant which does not change when the rate of productivity growth changes. We start our
systems on a balanced growth path, and so this seems like a reasonable assumption. In some
simulations we will change the inﬂation target ¯ π unexpectedly. We are assuming that once this
change is announced agents immediately adjust their nominal interest rate target downward.
15In this version of the paper we do not provide a formal proof for the stability of this system
under learning. However, we did verify stability with simulations.
16By estimating this equation the central bank can form an estimate of the trend
growth rate by considering its steady state
gy = κ0 + κ1y + κ2k + κ4i. (77)
Naturally, the bank does not know the steady state values of the system and needs
also an estimate for them. This can be done by estimating ϑt (thus using the
same information as the private sector does). We also assume that the bank and
the agents employ (74) together with the model consistent estimate of the output
growth rate to estimate the long run nominal interest rate. The actual law of motion
of the economy under these assumptions can be described in compact notation
˜ Vt = C1 + C2Et−1 ˜ V + C3Et−1 ˜ Vt+1 + C4 ˜ Vt−1 + C5 t (78)
where ˜ Vt =[ yt,πt,k t,i t,g yt] and
Et−1 ˜ V =
³
I − ˜ Ω1,t−1
´
˜ Ω0,t−1 (79)
where ˜ Ω includes the estimation of (76). Inserting the expectations we get16
˜ Vt = C1 + C2
³
I − ˜ Ω1,t−1
´−1
˜ Ω0,t−1 + C3˜ Ω0,t−1 + C3˜ Ω1,t−1 ˜ Vt−1+
C4˜ Ω0,t−1 + C4˜ Ω1,t−1˜ Ω0,t−1 + C4˜ Ω2
1,t−1 ˜ Vt−1 + C5 ˜ Vt−1 + C5 t, (80)
where Ci,i=1 ,2,3,4,5, denotes a conformable matrix.
3.2. One-sided learning
In this section we consider the case in which the only the central bank is learn-
ing.17 The implications of this assumption in the present model are strong. Rational
expectations on the part of the private sector means that each ﬁrm can observe not
only the change in its own productivity but also the change in productivity in all
other ﬁrms. Also, each household in taking consumption and investment decisions
is assumed to perfectly monitor the change in productivity. Hence the average
household knows more than the Federal Reserve about ﬁrm productivity.
Nevertheless, we want to compare the dynamics of inﬂation, the output growth
gap, and inﬂation expectations in this case to see whether it is more in line with
the data. Under the hypothesis of rational expectations of the private sector, the
model can be written as
Vt = D1 + D2Ecb
t−1gy + D3E
ps
t−1Vt+1 + D4Vt−1 + D5 t (81)
where the central bank and the private sector form diﬀerent expectations. The cen-
tral bank is assumed to be learning about the output growth rate and the long-run
16Again, in this version of the paper the stability of the system is not proven but is veriﬁed with
simulations.
17This assumption was used by Lansing (2001).
17nominal interest rate, using the same learning algorithm described in the previous
section.
In order to ﬁnd the rational forecast of the private sector we need a guess for
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Inserting (83) in (81) we ﬁnd the actual law of motion















+ D4Vt−1 + D5 t. (85)













0 = D1 + D2Ecb




















where the (*) indicates the rational expectations solution coeﬃcients.
The expression (86) is a matrix of coeﬃcients that is independent of the learning
process of the central bank. But the matrix of constants, equation (88), depends on
the central bank’s estimates of the long run growth rate of output. In fact, rational
expectations on the part of the private sector implies not only perfect information
about the productivity change but also perfect information about the mistakes of
the central bank. The actual law of motion of the economy under real time learning
is described by the following equation

















+ D4Vt−1 + D5 t. (89)
The dynamics of the economy are determined by (89) and by the learning algo-
rithm of the central bank.
184. QUANTITATIVE DYNAMICS IN THE BASELINE ECONOMY
4 . 1 . T h eb a s e l i n ee c o n o m y
We have outlined several possible versions of the model. In in order to organize
the discussion, we will begin by presenting results for a baseline case. We think
of the baseline economy as having two-sided learning–both the central bank and
the private sector learn. We assume the simple learning method (as opposed to the
model consistent method) for the central bank, and we use the calibration given
below. Later in the paper, we consider variations on this baseline and show how
results are aﬀected.
4.2. Calibration
We follow Woodford (2002) for the calibration of the following parameters of the
model to quarterly data. We assume the disutility from labor to be nearly linear,
assigning ν =0 .11,a n dw es e ta =1 .25. We also calibrate the discount factor
β =0 .994. Concerning the production side, we calibrate the capital share in the
production function α =0 .25, the depreciation rate of capital δ =0 .012,a n dt h e
adjustment cost coeﬃcient  ψ =3 .A l s o ,w es e tθ =7 .88, which implies a mark-up
about 15 percent. In contrast to Woodford (2002), we set the probability of not
changing the price ξ =0 .78, which is in line with the literature but higher than
Woodford’s choice. This is a consequence of our assumption of homogeneous capital,
and lowers the degree of persistence. Nevertheless, our parameterization implies
that ﬁrms re-optimize their price every 4.5 quarters, which is not implausible. We
stress that ﬁrms do change their prices every quarter in the model, even if not
optimally at each date. These parameters imply that ω =0 .47 and ¯ ω =0 .08.
We assume that the monetary authority uses the same Taylor-type policy rule
for the whole sample. For our baseline simulations we choose a value of ρ =0 .2,
in line with the estimate of Erceg and Levin (2001) for a similar rule. We set
φπ to 1.5, as in the standard Taylor rule and the coeﬃcient on output growth,
φy =0 .5, consistent with choice of Woodford (2002) for a similar rule. This is
also consistent with the assumption that the Federal Reserve emphasized output
stabilization in the seventies (see, for instance, the evidence in Orphanides (2001)).
We set the central bank’s inﬂation target to 4 percent, the approximate level of
inﬂation before the onset of the productivity slowdown.
We calibrate the change in productivity using the estimated trend under learning
calculated by Bullard and Duﬀy (2002). They ﬁnd a productivity break in the third
quarter of 1973. Productivity growth falls (in annual rates) from 2.47 percent to
1.21 percent. They also estimate the growth rate of the labor force. For the period
that we consider they ﬁnd a constant labor force growth rate of 1.88 percent. This
leads to a change in the aggregate output trend growth rate from 4.36 percent to 3.1
percent, at an annual rate, following the productivity slowdown. We also include an
increase in productivity growth (the “new economy”) beginning in the third quarter
19Preferences and technology Gain
νβξ αδ   ψ θa ζ
0.11 0.994 0.78 0.25 0.012 3.07 .88 1.25 0.03
Policy rule Growth factors
ρφ π φy γ0 γ1 γ2 η
0.21 .50 .51 .00612 1.00301 1.00462 1.00467
TABLE 1
The benchmark calibration.
of 1993. Bullard and Duﬀy (2002) estimate an increase in productivity growth to
an annual rate of 1.86 percent at that date. This implies an output growth rate of
3.75 percent. The corresponding quarterly values for γi,i=0 ,1,2 (corresponding
to the gross rate of productivity growth before the productivity slowdown, after
the productivity slowdown, and after the onset of the new economy) are given in
Table 1.
We calibrate the gain ζ (assumed to be the same for both the central bank and
the private sector) to 0.03. This yields a plausible speed of learning, implying that
the central bank almost fully detects the productivity break by 1980.
Since our goal is to study the transitional behavior output growth and inﬂation,
we follow the methodology of Bullard and Duﬀy (2002) and reduce the noise to al-
most zero (we append a shock with standard deviation 0.00001 to each equation).18
4.3. The response to a monetary policy shock under rational
expectations
We checked the impulse-response of key variables to a monetary policy shock.
Assuming rational expectations and using the baseline calibration for the economy,
the model replicated almost exactly the impulse-response functions obtained by
Woodford (2002) under the assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
4.4. Results for the baseline economy
4.4.1. Inﬂation
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀects on output growth and inﬂation of an unexpected
slowdown in productivity of the magnitude observed during the 1970s. We begin
with the inﬂation process. As shown in Figure 2, inﬂation increases from 4 percent
(the steady state) in 1970 to more than 7 percent in 1976–that is, the benchmark
economy generates an increase in inﬂation peaking at more than 300 basis points in
response to the productivity slowdown. For comparison purposes, we have plotted
18An alternative would be to include fundamental shocks to the economy, say to technology
and monetary policy, simulate with changes in trend, and average the result. Of course, we would
have to take a stand on the nature of these shocks. In this version of the paper we do not pursue
this strategy.









U.S PCE Inflation (dashed) vs Model (solid)
(No Change in Inflation Target)
FIG. 2 The inﬂation dynamics in the baseline model versus the U.S. data. Inﬂa-
tion increases signiﬁcantly in response to the productivity slowdown, but remains
persistently high.
t h ec o r eP C Ei n ﬂation data from Figure 1.19 The inﬂation rate stays higher after
1980 in the model than it does in the data. It does not fall sharply until the second
productivity growth shock, which is the beginning of the “new economy” in 1993.
The failure of inﬂation to fall suﬃciently20 depends in part on how aggressive
the Taylor rule is concerning the output growth gap–that is, how much weight
the central bank puts on the output growth component of the rule. Still, for any
plausible parameterization we did not observe the dramatic fall in inﬂation observed
in the data. We conclude that, according to this model, the productivity slowdown
could have sparked much of the observed increase in inﬂation during the 1970s, but
that, without other structural changes, the inﬂation rate would have stayed high
for many more years.
If we take the view that the model is a reasonable approximation of the economy,
this might be evidence that the policy rule changed in some way after 1979.21 We
consider one possible change, namely that the central bank changes the inﬂation
19This result is quite robust to changes in the choice of the gain ζ.
20Despite the appearances of the ﬁgure, it would eventually converge back to the steady state
rate of 4 percent. But that process takes many years.
21Possible changes could be a downward shift in the inﬂation target, as in Huh and Lansing
(1999) and Erceg and Levin (2001), or a change in the parameters of the Taylor rule. Orphanides
(2001) suggests that the coeﬃcient on the output gap has decreased after the 1980. Also, Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd that the inﬂation coeﬃcient is higher in the post-Volker sample. The
model tells a story that is consistent with those facts.









U.S. PCE Inflation (dashed) vs Model (solid)
FIG. 3 If the central bank unexpectedly lowers the inﬂation target to two percent
in 1980, the inﬂation dynamics begin to approximate the data quite well.
target to 2 percent in 1980. As Figure 3 demonstrates, this change helps capture
aspects of the Volker disinﬂation.
4.4.2. Output growth
After the productivity slowdown, output growth decreases. Figure 4 (at the end
of the paper) shows the real output growth trend implied by the baseline model
with a change in the inﬂation target against the actual real GDP growth rates in the
U.S. data. In general, the growth trend from the model tends to track the longer
run behavior of output growth in the data quite well. Perhaps not surprisingly,
actual output growth rates are quite volatile compared to the trends coming from
the model.
4.4.3. Inﬂation expectations
The model captures the behavior of actual versus expected inﬂation surprisingly
well, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 displays inﬂation and inﬂation expec-
tations data for the U.S. The expected inﬂa t i o ns e r i e si se x p e c t e dG D Pd e ﬂator
inﬂation four quarters ahead as measured by the median projection from the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters. The inﬂation series is GDP deﬂator inﬂation (from
NIPA). This inﬂation data is a diﬀerent measure that what is shown in Figure 1, in
order to keep the measured expectations matched with the actual inﬂation rate the
22professional forecasters were asked to predict. As is well known, inﬂation expecta-
tions were consistently below actual inﬂation until the early 1980s, and then stay
consistently above during much of the remainder of the sample. Figure 6 shows
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations from the model. These inﬂation expectations
are in line with the data in the sense that inﬂation expectations are too low in the
1970s, and then too high in the remainder of the sample. Our theory suggests that
this feature of the data is exactly what we should expect to observe if economic
actors have to learn about structural changes in productivity.
4.4.4. Policy mistakes
Figure 7 shows the misperception of the output growth gap, on which the policy
“mistakes” of the central bank are based. The central bank takes time to detect
the decreased trend in output growth following the productivity slowdown. Hence,
observing slow output growth it conjectures a lower output growth gap than in
the actual data. This implies a lower interest rate and a higher inﬂation rate than
would otherwise occur. This eﬀect is reinforced by the higher inﬂation expectations
of the private sector.
One way to think about how important the policy mistake is for the great inﬂa-
tion is to consider a case where only the private sector is learning. In this case the
bank is assumed to actually observe the change in productivity, therefore setting
the ‘correct’ interest rate according to the Taylor-type policy rule. We found that
the resulting inﬂation is generally lower, but still, the productivity slowdown has
as i g n i ﬁcant inﬂationary impact on the economy. In addition, the high inﬂation is
persistent. This example suggests that, even without a policy mistake, by following
a Taylor-type policy rule the central bank would not have avoided relatively high
inﬂation during the 1970s. The results also suggest the possibility that the central
bank may be able to stabilize inﬂation and output by responding not only to de-
viations of inﬂation and output from trend but also to a measure of private sector
expectations.22
4.5. Only the central bank learns
Our results for the baseline economy are based on the assumption that both
the private sector and the central bank are learning. In this subsection we consider
the case where only the central bank learns, and the private sector has rational
expectations, in order to assess how important it is for our results that we assume
the private sector must learn about structural changes as well. It turns out that this
version of the model does not match the data as well. First, under the assumption
that the private sector fully adjusts to the decrease in the real rate implied by the
22This policy suggestion has been made by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), based on a diﬀerent
argument. They ﬁnd that a policy rule that responds to expectations implies more robustness of
the RE equilibrium to expectational errors. Here we suggest that by responding to private sector’s
expectations the bank may be able to stabilize inﬂation more eﬀectively in the face of structural
change.
23productivity slowdown, the model predicts a decrease in inﬂation rather than an
increase! This because the agents know that the central bank is using a constant
which is too high in the Taylor rule. We also simulate the model assuming: 1)
that the households have to estimate the real rate but otherwise they have rational
expectations, and, 2) that both the bank and the private sector observe the change
in the real interest rate. This latter assumption is common in the literature.23
Under these two latter assumptions, the model with only central bank learning
predicts a smaller inﬂation, peaking about 100 basis points higher following the
productivity slowdown. Given that the private sector is assumed to know the
mistake of the central bank about the output growth gap, inﬂation expectations
are predicted to be higher than actual inﬂation, which conﬂicts with the evidence
presented in Figure 5. In addition, the model does not predict the downturn in the
growth rate of output that is present in the data.
This leads us to the conclusion that the hypothesis of both the central bank and
the private sector learning is the most appropriate to capture the behavior of the
U.S. economy after the productivity slowdown.
4.6. Model consistent growth estimates by the central bank
In our baseline economy, the central bank uses the simple method to estimate a
trend growth rate for the economy. In this subsection we describe how our ﬁndings
change if the central bank uses the model-consistent estimator of the growth rate.
First of all, and perhaps not surprisingly, such an estimator seems to be more
eﬃcient in estimating changes in the trend rate of output growth. In general,
it takes less time to learn about most of the change in trend under the model
consistent method. In addition, the inﬂation rate is lower through the whole sample.
Nevertheless, as Figure 8 suggests, the long run behavior of the inﬂation process
seems to be quite consistent with the data. This suggests that even a more eﬃcient
use of information than we have assumed in our baseline economy would not have
avoided most of the inﬂation observed in the U.S. data.
5. DISCUSSION
We have analyzed the eﬀects of permanent changes in productivity trends on
inﬂation, when the economy’s actors must learn about the changes in trend and
the central bank is committed to using a Taylor-type policy rule. We ﬁnd that a
productivity slowdown of the magnitude observed in the 1970s causes a signiﬁcant
a n dp e r s i s t e n tr i s ei ni n ﬂation in the model economy, peaking at more than 300
basis points. A permanent increase in the rate of productivity growth–the “new
economy” of the 1990s–then causes a reduction in inﬂation. These eﬀects alone
are not suﬃcient to provide a qualitative match to the U.S. inﬂation experience,
because of the sharp decline in inﬂation observed in the early 1980s. However,
by adding an unexpected reduction in the inﬂation target of the central bank,
23See, for example, Orphanides (2001).
24we were able to provide a qualitative match for the data. We conclude that the
misperceived-change-in-trend hypothesis has considerable merit in explaining the
medium-run dynamics of inﬂation in the U.S. since 1970.
We think the policy conclusions from this exercise are quite important. Our
analysis suggests that, should a shock of the magnitude of the productivity slow-
down occur again in the future, it could generate a considerable inﬂation distur-
bance, even if policymakers do their best to remain committed to a Taylor-type
policy rule and to estimate the changing growth trends in the economy. Thus,
when evaluating Taylor-type policy rules, an additional criterion might be, How
well does the rule insulate the economy in the event of structural change?
We have analyzed this economy under a hypothesis of rare, permanent shocks to
productivity growth. We think this is a good characterization of the data based on
our reading of the econometric literature concerning structural change. Agents pro-
tect themselves against the possibility of such a rare shock by employing a version
of constant gain learning. Because the system is stable under learning, the agents
can then adapt to the new rational expectations equilibrium following a structural
break. We view this approach as one model-consistent method of addressing issues
like this. There is another method, which we think is also interesting, but ultimately
less satisfactory. That method retains the rational expectations assumption, and
models the permanent shocks that appear to be in the data as a regime-switching
process. Agents understand that there are two (or more) regimes, and rationally
infer which regime they are in and how likely they are to transit to an alternative
regime when making decisions. In this approach, the rational expectations assump-
tion is completely consistent with the model, and the dynamics of the economy are
completely characterized by a rational expectations equilibrium. Again, we think
this is an interesting approach. The drawback is that the agents in the model must
have speciﬁc alternative regimes in mind, along with the associated transition prob-
abilities, when making decisions. Thus, as usual, the informational demands of the
rational expectations assumption are stringent. In reality, there are many possible
alternative regimes, most of which have rarely, if ever, occurred. Under the learning
approach we have used here, the agents are in some sense prepared to adapt to any
type of structural change that might occur in the economy, so long as it is not so
disruptive as to destabilize the system. Therefore, we think the approach we have
outlined here provides a reasonable modelling strategy.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE MARGINAL COST EQUATION
From the linearized equations we have
˜ St (f)=˜ wt (f) − α˜ kt (f)+α˜ Lt (f) (90)
as well as
˜ RK
t =˜ wt (f)+˜ Lt (f) − ˜ kt (f), (91)
˜ yt (f)=α˜ kt (f)+( 1− α) ˜ Lt (f), (92)
and
˜ wt (f)=ν˜ Lt (f) − ˜ λt. (93)
Using the latter equations we obtain
˜ St (f)=ω(˜ yt (f) − ˜ kt (f)) + ν˜ kt (f) − ˜ λt, (94)
27where ω = ωp +ωw,ω p = α
1−α, and ωw = ν
1−α. The average real marginal cost can
thus be expressed as
˜ St = ω(˜ yt − ˜ kt)+ν˜ kt − ˜ λt. (95)
Also, the equation for the real rental price of capital becomes
˜ RK
t = ωw˜ yt (f)+˜ ct +
ωw
ν





˜ kt (f) − ωp˜ kt (f) − ˜ kt (f). (96)
















˜ kt (f) − ˜ λt (97)
=( ω +1 )
³
˜ yt (f) − ˜ kt (f)
´
− ν˜ kt (f) − ˜ λt
= ρy˜ yt (f) − ρk˜ kt (f) − ˜ λt
where ρy =( ω +1 )and ρk = ρy−ν. Substituting this equation in (94) to eliminate
the capital stock variable we can express the marginal cost in terms of ﬁrm f output
and the average marginal cost, which is equation (34).
APPENDIX B: THE STEADY STATE
The real variables other than labor are expressed in stationary terms (i.e. per
eﬀective worker). We begin with
¯ RK = γβ
−1 − 1+δ, (98)
where a bar indicates a steady state value. From the investment equation
¯ I
¯ k
= γη − 1+δ. (99)
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From this last equation, it is easy to check that, provided β
−1 <η(which is
veriﬁed in our parameterization), a decrease in productivity leads to a increase in
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29Because both ¯ L and ¯ y/¯ L are negatively related to productivity, ¯ y is also negatively
related to productivity. Hence, a productivity slowdown will increase ¯ y. Finally,













US output growth (dashed) vs Model (solid) 
FIG. 4 The output growth trend from the benchmark model with an inﬂation target
change in 1980, as compared to output growth rates in the data. Not surprisingly,
output growth rates are highly variable in the data relative to the model.








Actual (solid) vs Expected US Inflation
FIG. 5 Actual versus expected inﬂation in the U.S. data. As is well-known, ex-
pectations appear to “lag behind” inﬂation.











Model Inflation: Actual (solid) vs Expected (dashed) 
FIG. 6 Actual versus expected inﬂation in the benchmark model with an inﬂation
target change in 1980. Expectations tend to be too low in the 1970s and too
high later in the sample, consistent with the data as shown in Figure 5. The model
suggests that this is what one should expect to observe when households are learning
about structural productivity changes.











FIG. 7 The policy “mistakes” of the central bank are based on misperceptions of
the output growth gap.









U.S. PCE Inflation (dashed) vs Model Inflation (solid)
(Model Consistent Estimator)
FIG. 8 The behavior of inﬂation in the model versus the U.S. data in the benchmark
economy when the central bank uses a model-consistent estimator of the output
growth rate. This example includes the reduction in the inﬂation target in 1980.
The inﬂation performance is largely the same even when the central bank uses more
information.
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